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Trade Controls for Political Ends: Four Perspectives
Andreas F. Lowenfeld*
The prevailing view among commentators (if not among policymakers) is
that economic sanctions are a bad idea-bad economics, bad politics, bad law.
Just a few minutes in the library turns up articles and books such as Economic
Sanctions: Obstruction or Instrument for World Trade? (and you can guess the answer);
Ineffectiveness of Economic Sanctions: Same Song Same Refrain?;2 Feeling Good or Doing
Good with Sanctionr'3 Altering U.S. Sanctions Poliy;4 and so on.
Most of the critique of economic sanctions has been directed at so-called
"unilateral sanctions," which are sanctions imposed (alone or with the usual
allies) by the United States. The fact that the UN Security Council has instituted
a plethora of economic sanctions' since the automatic Soviet veto melted away
in 1991, has taken away one of the arguments against imposition of sanctions,
but has generally not converted the opponents of sanctions to supporters of
non-forcible measures of international diplomacy.6
I. WAR AND SANCTIONS AS ALTERNATIVES:
THE CASE OF IRAQ
Within a week of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the UN
Security Council adopted a program of mandatory economic sanctions designed
Herbert and Rose Rubin Professor of International Law, New York University School of
Law.
1 Abbis J. All and Robert C. Camp, Economic Sanctions: Obstruction or Instrument for World Trade?,
Managerial Fin 66 (1999).
2 Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Ineffectiveness of Economic Sanctions: Same Song
Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990's, 89 Am Econ Rev 403 (1999).
3 Ernest H. Preeg, Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions. Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the
U.S. National Interest (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1999).
4 Dianne Feinstein, et al, Altering U.S. Sanctions Poligy, Final Report of the CSIS Project on Unilateral
Economic Sanctions (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1999).
5 I cannot resist pointing out the two almost completely opposite meanings of the same word:
(1) to approve or ratify; (2) to punish.
6 As of August 2003, the Security Council had invoked Article 41 of the UN Charter fourteen
times to impose sanctions. Sanction programs were in effect with respect to Afghanistan,
Iraq, Liberia, Libya (suspended but not revoked), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.
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to induce Iraq to withdraw from what it called its 19th Province.7 The sanctions
did not work, and war became the alternative accepted by the international
community.8 At the end of that war, with Saddam Hussein still in power, the
Security Council adopted a massive program of sanctions designed to prevent
the rearming of Iraq.9 For the next twelve years these sanctions remained in
place, with the only major modification involving the Oil for Food Program,
instituted in 1995.10
Russia and France repeatedly urged termination or substantial easing of the
sanctions, on the ground that they had failed to bring down the government of
Saddam Hussein but had caused massive damage to the civilian population of
Iraq. For its part the United States insisted on maintaining the sanctions
substantially intact, blaming the Iraqi regime for the suffering of the
population. 1 As the United States became disenchanted with sanctions in 2002-
03, France, Russia, and Germany suddenly favored continuation of sanctions as
an alternative to war. As everyone knows, war trumped.
Does the Iraq story confirm and validate the principal justification for
economic sanctions-an alternative to war on the one hand, "business as usual"
on the other? In round I, the sanctions unanimously agreed to by the Security
Council worked, in the sense that they kept the international community focused
on the invasion of Kuwait. Consider what would have happened if the Security
Council had gone no further than its first resolution of August 2, 1990, merely
"condemning" the invasion and calling upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin
7 Security Council Res No 661, UN Doc No S/RES/661 (1990).
8 In Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990, the Security Council:
Authorize[d] Member States co-operating with the government of Kuwait,
unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements [prior resolutions
demanding complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait] to use all
necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all
subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security
in the area.
The United States took that as authorization for war and on January 17, 1991, launched the
air phase of Operation DESERT STORM. Security Council Res No 678, UN Doc No
S/RES/678 (1990).
9 Security Council Res No 687, UN Doc No S/RES/687 (1991).
10 Security Council Res No 986, UN Doc No S/RES/986 (1995). In brief, the resolution
permitted member states to import petroleum and petroleum products in return for payment
into an escrow account up to a fixed amount. Funds in the escrow account could be used by
Iraq to purchase food and medicines for essential civilian needs, under supervision of the
United Nations.
11 See, for instance, the following statement by Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright in May
1998:
[TMhe fact that Iraqi children are dying is not the fault of the United States, but
of Saddam Hussein .... [It is ridiculous for the United States to be blamed
for the dictatorial and cruel, barbaric ways that Saddam Hussein treats his
people.
Quoted in F. Gregory Gause III, Getting It Backward on Iraq, 78 Foreign Aff 54, 59 (1999).
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"intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences."' 2 But the
sanctions did not advance the objective of withdrawal of Iraqi troops from
Kuwait, and war became the alternative generally accepted by the international
community. In Round II, sanctions worked in the sense that they were a
substitute for a war that some, but not all of the international community,
thought should have been taken to the end in the spring of 1991. Again consider
what would have happened if the Security Council had limited itself in March
1991 to accepting the cessation of hostilities 3 and in April 1991 to a demand
that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary
between them. 4 There were in fact only two options: erect a massive regime of
sanctions, or resume the war. The first option lasted twelve years, the second
about six weeks.
As of this writing, it is too early to reach a definite judgment on the
outcome. I submit, however, that the Iraq case illustrates the use of force and
the use of economic sanctions as alternatives. In situations that one really cares
about, it is unpersuasive to be opposed both to the use of force and to economic
sanctions.
II. SANCTIONS AND THE COLD WAR: LOOKING BACK
The United States Export Control Act of 1949 entered into effect on
February 26, 1949.'" At that moment the Berlin Blockade was in full force. All
civilian rail, road, and barge traffic between Berlin and the Allied zones of
Germany had been cut off in June 1948, and West Berlin was being supplied
entirely by US and British aircraft carrying food, coal, machinery, and all other
16
necessities. Exactly one year earlier, a bloodless coup in Czechoslovakia had
planted that country firmly in the Communist camp, thereby completing the
Iron Curtain that was to divide Europe for more than forty years. Italy, and
especially Greece, remained vulnerable to threats of Communist takeover. Stalin
was in absolute control of the Soviet Union and its satellites (except Yugoslavia).
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was in the process of
formation.
12 Security Council Res No 660, UN Doc No S/RES/660 (1990).
13 See Security Council Res No 686, UN Doc No S/RES/686 (1991).
14 See Security Council Res No 687, UN Doc No S/RES/687 (1991).
15 Pub L No 11, 63 Stat 7 (1949), codified at 50 USC app §§ 2021-32 (2000).
16 Since most of the readers of this essay will not have been alive at the time (or will have been
too young to remember those exciting days), it is worth noting that the Berlin Blockade was
instituted thirteen years before erection of the Berlin Wall, which physically separated the
Eastern and Western sectors of Berlin from August 1961 until November 1989. The Berlin
Blockade lasted 10'/2 months from June 1948 to May 1949.
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A. RUNNING A COLD WAR
From 1949 on for the next four decades, the Export Control Act was the
principal instrument for economic sanctions by the United States vis-A-vis the
USSR and its allies.17 The basic scheme under the Export Control Act and its
successor statute was that all commercial exports from the United States-of
technology as well as of goods-required a license from the Department of
Commerce as a condition for leaving a United States port. 8 Most exports could
be made under general license regardless of destination; for some products a
particular or "validated" license was required, which might or might not be
granted depending on the country in question and the proposed end user.
In principle, validated licenses were required for products that might have
strategic uses, but of course many products could have both civilian and military
uses.19 Further, as Europe and Japan gradually caught up with the United States
in industrial know-how, an increasing number of the products and technology
requiring validated licenses for exports were available to the Soviet Union and its
allies from other countries, and there were continuing debates over which
products should be subject to the requirement of a validated license and under
what circumstances such licenses should be granted. Not infrequently, different
agencies of the US government took conflicting positions on these issues, with
Commerce usually, though not always, leaning toward permitting an export
transaction to go through; Defense concerned about strategic uses, such as
advances in electronic communications; and State worried about what "signals"
a given licensing decision might send to the target countries.
Looked at individually and in retrospect, many of the decisions on the
administration of export controls seem unpersuasive, and some downright silly.20
Viewed as a whole, however, and within the framework of comparing alternative
policies, the export control program, it seems to me, does not look so bad. The
Cold War between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its
allies remained cold for over forty years. From roughly 1948 to 1991,
communism did not spread in Europe beyond the borders imposed at the end
of World War II, nuclear weapons were never used, and the local wars in the
divided nations of Asia-Korea and Vietnam-did not ignite a general
17 Sanctions against the People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and later
Cuba were for the most part implemented pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50
USC app § 5(b) (2000), administered by the Treasury Department and (with very few
exemptions) permitting no trade or financial transactions at all.
18 Export Administration Acts of 1969 and 1979 and various amendments, 50 USC app
2401-20 (2000).
19 Premier Khrushchev once suggested that buttons should be controlled, since they could be
used to hold up soldiers' trousers.
20 For instance, a device to harvest sugar beets was denied an export license because it was
powered by a V-8 engine that could also be used in a military command vehicle.
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conflagration. Of course, one cannot attribute this outcome solely to a program
of export controls and denial of strategic products. But would the outcome have
been the same if the United States had permitted its industrial companies,
investors, banks, and promoters to trade freely with the Soviet Union and its
satellites? Could the United States have held together the NATO alliance, both
militarily and in connection with the member countries' own programs of
control and denial, if it had not shown that it was prepared to make economic
sacrifices-that is, lost sales-to counter the communist threat? It seems fair to
say that the strategy of economic sanctions as an alternative to military force or
"business as usual" was the only alternative.
B. "FINE TUNING"
Another aspect of economic sanctions and US policy in the Cold War was
perhaps not appreciated at the outset but became increasingly significant over
time. The broad delegation granted to the President by the Export Control Act
and its successor statutes enabled the executive branch to divide the world into
"country groups" for purposes of export licensing. It was the opposite of most-
favored-nation treatment, which has generally governed American trade policy
since 1934, with emphasis on imports. But it enabled the United States (not
without controversy) to differentiate by use of incentives and disincentives
among the different countries comprising what had started out as the monolithic
Soviet bloc but gradually attained quite different levels of self-determination
within the Soviet orbit.
When the first set of regulations were issued under the Export Control Act
of 1949, the world, apart from the United States and Canada, was divided into
two groups-the Western Hemisphere (Group 0) and all other countries
(Group R). Just after the Korean War began in the summer of 1950, a Subgroup
A was carved out of Group R to include all communist countries except
Yugoslavia, and in effect Subgroup A was further divided after mainland China
entered the Korean War in December 1950 by a policy of not issuing any
licenses for exports to countries designated under the Trading with the Enemy
Act. In 1957, by way of encouragement for its tentative steps away from total
dependence on Moscow, Poland was removed from Subgroup A, thus
differentiating it from Hungary, whose own tentative steps toward independence
had been brutally crushed by Soviet troops. When the United States and
Romania held talks on improving relations in 1964, one of the advantages that
the United States was able to offer was to place Romania in the same class as
Poland for purposes of export licensing. Later, Hungary to some extent slipped
its moorings from Moscow, and joined Poland in Group W.2 By 1982, the
21 For an explanation and defense of this policy by the US Secretary of State, see Dean Rusk,
Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently, 50 Dept of State Bull 390 (1964).
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world according to the Export Administration Regulations had been divided
into eight country groups, ranging from Group P-Peoples' Republic of China;
through Group Y-Soviet Union and other Communist states except Hungary,
Romania and Poland; to the most severely restricted Group Z-Cuba,
Kampuchea (Cambodia), North Korea and Vietnam. Again, I am not
suggesting that all of this "fine tuning" was successful, or even sensible. I do
submit, however, to borrow from Clausewitz, that sanctions too are a
continuation of politics by other means.23
III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is evident from the preceding sections that I disagree with those who
condemn all economic sanctions. My support for sanctions, however, is subject
to an important proviso. Like other actions of states in the international arena,
economic sanctions are subject to the constraints of international law. That law
as pertinent to unilateral sanctions is comprised, in my view, of two essential
elements. First, international law imposes limits on jurisdiction to prescribe and
jurisdiction to enforce-that is, on extraterritorial application of-a nation's
laws. 24 Second, international law-yes, customary international law-embraces the
doctrine of proportionality, which is almost always relevant in the context of
international economic sanctions.25
The famous case of the confrontation between the United States and
Western Europe over the Siberian Gas Pipeline may serve as an illustration of
both propositions and also as another example of the choice between doing
nothing (the Europeans' preference) and "doing something"-the decision of
the United States. Since almost a full generation has passed since the events of
1981-82, a brief summary of the events is in order.
22 Export Administration Regulations as of 1982, 15 CFR pt 370, supp 1. As of August 2003,
these regulations set out a more complicated system, reflecting some eight rationales for
export controls, including crime control, counterterrorism, as well as national security, and
regional stability.
23 Carl von Clausewitz, Von Kriege (1832). The actual text is somewhat more elaborate, but the
common quotation in English reads "War is nothing more than the continuation of politics
by other means."
24 See generally Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 5 401-
88 (1987) (see especially introductory note).
25 I do not address here the view once held that any measures taken by a state for purposes of
foreign policy or national security are contrary to international law. That view finds some
support in Article 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States of 1948 (Article
19 of the 1967 revision), and also in the Declaration of the UN General Assembly on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625, 25 UN GAOR
Supp No 28 at 121, 65 Am J Intl L 243 (1979), but is now largely regarded as overtaken by
events. See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal
Regime 5-6 n 6 (Cambridge 1988).
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A. THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE CASE
The background of the confrontation was twofold. On one side, six
countries in Western Europe had contracted in 1980-81 with the Soviet Union
to build a large-diameter pipeline to carry natural gas from the Yamal Peninsula
near the Arctic Circle in Western Siberia to a place in Germany from which the
gas was to be distributed by smaller pipelines to utilities in the six countries. The
West European countries would finance the project, estimated to cost between
ten and fifteen billion dollars, to be repaid with proceeds from the sale of the
natural gas. The pipe, compressor stations, and pipe-laying equipment were to
be procured, so far as possible, in the states making the loans. For the Soviet
Union, the project was a way to earn hard currency and to tap a huge, thus far
unused resource base; for the West European countries the project was seen as a
way to reduce their energy dependence on the unstable Middle East as well as a
way to employ unemployed steel workers in productive tasks.
The United States had no direct role in the project, but having recently
completed the trans-Alaska pipeline, its companies had certain technical
capabilities difficult to duplicate in Western Europe. Several European
companies that had committed themselves to build portions of the pipeline had
contracts to purchase components and equipment and to use technology under
licenses from American companies such as General Electric, Caterpillar Tractor,
and others. Moreover, a number of European subsidiaries of American
companies were engaged in portions of the project. The US government, though
opposed to the project on policy grounds, had imposed no legal impediments to
participation by American companies in supplying equipment or technology to
the project.
On the other side, communism was beginning to loosen in Eastern
Europe, particularly in Poland. A labor union at a shipyard in Gdansk (formerly
Danzig) had gone on strike in August 1980 and had seized the shipyard. The
strike had spread throughout Poland, a new popular leader, Lech Walesa, had
emerged, and a new movement had been born: Solidarity. For sixteen months,
freedom in Poland seemed to grow day by day. Close to ten million people
joined Solidarity, a related movement arose among Poland's farmers, and even
the Central Committee of the Communist Party held free elections by secret
ballot, with the result that only one-tenth of the membership was reelected.
At midnight on Saturday, December 12, 1981, everything changed. Warsaw
was ringed by tanks, soldiers manned check points on all major roads, and
guards stood outside major buildings with their bayonets fixed. At 6 a.m.
Sunday, December 13, martial law and a national emergency were proclaimed.
All public gatherings were forbidden, Solidarity's leaders were arrested,
telephone lines were cut, and a total news blackout was imposed. The tanks and
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soldiers now running Poland were Polish, not Russian; in Washington, however,
the perception was that the Soviet Union must be behind the crackdown.
In Western Europe, the political leaders deplored the situation in Poland,
but (with minor exceptions) imposed no sanctions. President Reagan, in
contrast, responded to martial law in Poland by saying, "[W]e're not letting them
get away with it."26
Within two weeks, the United States put in place a program of export
controls and related economic sanctions, both against Poland and against the
Soviet Union. The most important sanction concerned the pipeline:27 all exports
from the United States destined to be used for the pipeline, regardless of country
of destination or level of technology, would henceforth require a license, and no
licenses would be issued. As with other export controls, penalties for violation
would include "denial of export privileges" for the firm in question, regardless
of its place of establishment or of its place in the chain of export.
28
The announcement brought about some grumbling from Western Europe,
especially from firms contractually obligated to deliver compressors to the Soviet
Union that contained components built in the United States, and also from
governments irritated about the lack of consultation. There were no vehement
protests, however, and no assertion that the United States had transgressed
international standards. As a matter of international law, the United States had
exercised its territorial jurisdiction to control exports of products and technology
originating in the United States.
By the spring of 1982, however, there was no sign that the situation in
Poland had improved. Efforts by the United States to persuade the European
states to join in sanctions against the Soviet Union and Poland had essentially
come to naught. In June 1982, following an economic summit in Versailles,
President Reagan decided to tighten the screws. New regulations were issued to
include (1) equipment produced abroad by foreign subsidiaries of US
companies; and (2) equipment produced abroad by foreign-owned companies
under technology licenses issued by US companies. 29 The assertion of
26 News Conference of President Ronald Reagan, Dec 17, 1981, 17 Weekly Comp Pres Docs
1379, 1381 (Dec 21, 1981).
27 Other sanctions included suspension of landing rights in the United States for the Soviet
airline, Aeroflot; closing of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States;
suspension or non-renewal of licenses for export of high technology items to the Soviet
Union; and suspension of negotiations looking to a long-term grain agreement, a maritime
agreement and agreements on scientific and cultural exchanges.
28 The controls were announced by President Reagan in his Christmas address of December 23,
1980, and in a follow-up statement a few days later. 17 Weekly Comp Pres Docs 1404, 1406
(Dec 23, 1981).
29 Statement of the President on Extension of US Sanctions, June 18, 1982, 18 Weekly Comp
Pres Docs 820 (June 21, 1982), implemented by the Department of Commerce at 47 Fed Reg
27250 (June 24, 1982).
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jurisdiction under (1) was not new; it had been asserted by the United States in
the past in order to frustrate evasion of US embargoes against China, Cuba, and
other countries designated under the Trading with the Enemy Act and its
successor statute, though not under export controls.30 One could fairly say that
restraints on the activities of foreign subsidiaries were a subject of continuing
controversy between the United States and its allies, neither clearly supported by
nor clearly contrary to international law.3'
The assertion under (2), in contrast, was unprecedented-a new link, based
on private licenses between American and foreign companies. The reaction in
Europe to this assertion of jurisdiction was quick and uniformly negative. The
foreign ministers of the European Community met within a few days and
declared: "This action, taken without consultation with the Community, implies
an extraterritorial extension of US jurisdiction, which in the circumstances is
contrary to the principles of international law."32 More than that, the
governments of Great Britain, France, and West Germany (but not Italy)
ordered companies organized in their territories (locally owned as well as those
owned by American firms) to carry out their contractual obligations,
notwithstanding the prohibition under the US regulations.
Even as the US Department of Commerce was issuing "denial orders" to
firms that were continuing to work on the pipeline, thereby making them
ineligible to participate in any US export transaction, other parts of the US
government were coming to the conclusion that the June sanctions order was
untenable. American diplomats seeking agreement on a variety of other issues
found that every conversation came down to the Pipelines Sanctions. Instead of
focusing on East-West tensions and the bad things happening in Poland, the
sanctions had become a major West-West issue, not only pitting the United
States against its West European allies but dividing the American business
community, the legal community, and the Congress.33
30 For examples of the use of this basis of jurisdiction, as well as a more detailed account of the
Gas Pipeline case, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends 90-95, 267-306
(Matthew Bender 2d ed 1983).
31 For extended discussion, see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 414 (cited in note 24) and the sources there cited.
32 Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the European Community, June 23, 1982, NY Times
Al (June 24, 1982). Subsequently, the European Community submitted a longer Aide-Mmoire
developing the arguments about violation by the United States of international law, reprinted
in 21 ILM 891 (1982). It is worth noting that the legal part of the Aide-Mimoire was based
largely on American sources, including both the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (1965) and early drafts of what became the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987).
33 In August 1982, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives approved a
bill to terminate the export controls related to the pipeline. When the bill came to a vote in
the full House, it failed by only three votes (206-203). An amended version of the bill,
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One case related to the pipeline sanctions was actually litigated in Europe.34
The Dutch subsidiary of an American company had a contract with a French
firm to supply geological sensing equipment for use in construction of the
pipeline. On orders from the parent company, the subsidiary notified the French
company that it would be unable to perform its obligations under the contract.
The French company brought suit in The Netherlands for specific performance,
and on September 17, 1982, the District Court in The Hague gave judgment for
the plaintiff, ordering delivery of the equipment contracted for not later than
October 18, on penalty of a 10,000 guilder fine per day of default after that
date.35 Though the court was careful not to exclude all extra-territorial
jurisdiction, it stated the general principle that it is not permissible for a state to
exercise jurisdiction over acts performed outside its borders and held that none
of the grounds for exceptions to the principle was applicable.
By the fall of 1982, the US government was looking for a graceful way out.
On November 13, 1982, President Reagan announced that the export controls
of December 1981 and June 1982 directed against the Siberia-Western Europe
natural gas pipeline would be revoked immediately, in the context of an
agreement with the nations of Western Europe on an "enduring, realistic, and
security-minded economic policy toward the Soviet Union .. .a victory for all
the allies." 36
Two days earlier General Secretary Brezhnev had died. One day later the
leader of Solidarity, Lech Walesa, was released from detention and permitted to
return to his family in Gdansk. Whether these events and the revocation of the
pipeline regulations were connected either in causation or timing is not known.
Nor is it known to what extent, if any, the American sanctions affected Soviet
actions vis-t-vis Poland or other East European states. What is clear is that
exercise by the United States of jurisdiction over foreign enterprises on the basis
of ownership or control by a parent corporation established in the United States,
already strongly criticized, came under further attack, and has been resorted to
more sparingly since that time.37 Exercise by the United States of jurisdiction
including a provision for waiver, was subsequently approved by the House but did not come
to vote in the Senate.
34 Compagnie Europdenne des Petroles, SA v Sensor Nederland, BV, Distr Ct, The Hague, Sept 17,
1982, 36 Rechtspraak van de Week-Kort Geding 167, translated in 22 ILM 66 (1983).
35 Id.
36 Radio address of President Reagan of November 13, 1982, 18 Weekly Comp Pres Docs 1475
(Nov 19, 1982). The regulations were formally revoked on November 16, effective
November 13, 1982, 47 Fed Reg 51858 (Nov 18, 1982), and denial orders in effect against
German, French, Italian, and British firms were vacated on the same day on motion of the
Commerce Department. No text of the agreement referred to by President Reagan was ever
published.
37 See, for example, Kenneth A. Rodman, Sanctions beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and
U.S. Economic Statecraft 3-6 (Rowman & Littlefield 2001).
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over foreign unaffiliated enterprises on the basis of still thinner links, such as
commercial technology licenses, was almost universally condemned, and could
not be defended on legal grounds.
No treaty or even joint communiqu6 emerged to memorialize the holding
of the Pipeline Case. But the outcome created an important precedent.
Application of economic sanctions abroad was not just a question of power-
that is, the threat of denying the huge American market to firms not complying
with US regulations. Commonly understood precepts of international law
impose limits on the exercise of jurisdiction to regulate conduct outside the
regulating state's territory. In formulating the reach of its economic sanctions, a
state (typically the United States) must take these precepts into account; violation
of the precepts comes at a cost that may well be greater than any advantage
gained from defying them.
B. HELMS-BURTON
The lesson of the Pipeline case was only imperfectly learned in the United
States. In the early 1990s, following the end of subsidies to Cuba from the now
defunct Soviet Union, Fidel Castro changed his country's policy and for the first
time encouraged private investment and tourism. Elements of the US Congress,
as well as the Cuban-American community, became concerned that investors
from France, Italy, Spain, Canada, and elsewhere would take over and refurbish
properties that had belonged to American interests or to former Cubans who
had become American citizens since the Cuban Revolution three decades earlier.
Further, the proponents of what became known as the Helms-Burton Act38
(named after its principal sponsors in the Senate and House), were also
concerned that the Clinton administration might be growing "soft on Cuba" and
might relax the embargo on trade and financial transactions with Cuba that had
been in effect with little change since 1962. To simplify a rather complicated
piece of legislation,3 9 Helms-Burton essentially froze the regulations issued under
the Trading with the Enemy Act "as in effect on March 1, 1996," including
prohibitions applicable to foreign subsidiaries of a US-based parent
corporation.4" If one believes in executive discretion and fine tuning, this
38 Formally, the Act was known as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act
of 1996, Pub L No 104-114, 110 Stat 785, codified at 22 USC § 6021 et seq (2000)
(hereinafter the Helms-Burton Act).
39 For a detailed description of the Helms-Burton Act (as well as its legislative and political
history) by the present author, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton
Act, 90 Am J Intl L 419 (1996), reprinted in Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Role of Government in
International Trade: Essays over Three Decades (Cameron 2000).
40 Helms-Burton Act § 102(h).
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provision is poor policy, regardless of one's views about policy toward Cuba.4'
But so long as it relates only to trade or financial transactions to or from the
United States, it does not violate international law. Not so for Title III of the
Helms-Burton Act, "Protection of Property Rights of United States Nationals."
The scheme of Title III is to create a right of action in US courts on behalf
of any US national who has a claim for property confiscated by Cuba since
January 1, 1959, against any person who traffics in such property. The details are
somewhat complicated, both with respect to the effective date and with respect
to who is eligible to bring the action and when. But the idea is clear: whoever
"traffics" in property that once belonged to US nationals is to be confronted
with the prospect of litigation in the United States, and of exposure to damages
equal in the first instance to the value of the property in question, and if the
trafficking continues, to treble damages.42 "Trafficking," a word heretofore used
almost exclusively in reference to dealing in narcotics, is defined to include not
only selling, transferring, buying, or leasing the property in question, but also
"engaging in a commercial activity arising or otherwise benefiting from
confiscated property."43 Thus the Act contemplates that if an English company
that purchases sugar from a Cuban state enterprise and also does business in the
United States and therefore is amenable to the jurisdiction of a US court, it
would be liable to a US national who could show that some of the English
company's purchases consisted of sugar grown on the plantation that the
plaintiff once owned. There is no necessary connection between the value of the
property on which the claim is based and the value of the transaction on which
the assertion of "trafficking" rests.
It seems that the principal purpose of the Helms-Burton Act was not to
stimulate litigation in the United States, but to deter nationals of third countries
from doing business with and investing in Cuba. Since virtually all commercial
enterprises in Cuba were taken over by the government in the years after Fidel
Castro came to power, whether they previously belonged to US nationals, Cuban
nationals, or third country nationals, any person that dealt with an enterprise that
existed prior to January 1, 1959, or with an enterprise that could be regarded as a
successor to such an enterprise, stood exposed to litigation in the United States
if it did business or otherwise could be found in the United States. Of course,
not all such litigation, if it took place, would result in a final judgment against the
defendant. Plaintiffs would, it seems, have the burden of proving that
defendants were dealing in their confiscated property, and there might well be
41 The freeze was made subject to one exception under § 204, which authorizes the President to
take steps to suspend the embargo, but only upon submitting a determination to Congress
that a transition government, that is, a government without Fidel Castro or his brother, is in
power in Cuba. Id § 204.
42 Id § 302(a).
43 Id § 4(13).
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different interpretations of what that meant. 44 But no one likes to face a lawsuit
with high potential damages, least of all in the United States. And just in case the
potential defendant's calculation might result in preferring to continue the
commercial relation with Cuba even at the risk of litigation in the United States,
Helms-Burton provides that if the proscribed conduct is continued beyond a 90-
day grace period, damages are to be trebled.
Given the doubtful prospects of business in Cuba in any event and the
huge potential of the American market, the proponents of Helms-Burton were
fairly confident that persons who contemplated investment in Cuba or
transactions with Cuba would change their minds, and that those who had
already made such deals would look for ways to unload their investments or
terminate their contracts. To the extent this was true, Helms-Burton was
extraterritorial legislation of the worst kind. No one, I submit, could have
supported a United States law that read:
It shall be unlawful for any person or firm, wheresoever located and
regardless of its nationality, to do business with or invest in a firm based or
organized in Cuba.
Helms-Burton does not quite say that. It is not a prohibition, only a threat
of exposure to litigation and heavy damages. But the effect, if it were to be
implemented as its proponents hoped, would be the same and, in my view, so
would its inconsistency with international law. Many commentators, including
the present author, took this position.
45
The reaction outside the United States, and particularly within the
European Community, was similar to the reaction in the Pipeline case. Once
more, the United States was exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction on an
unprecedented and unacceptable basis. The European Commission drafted and
later issued a regulation to prevent European companies from complying with
Helms-Burton and to enable them to recover amounts awarded against them by
American courts.46 Moreover, the European Commission on behalf of the
European Union brought a formal complaint to the WTO, asserting that Helms-
44 For instance, does sugar grown in 1996 on land that belonged to plaintiff in 1958 qualify as
plaintiffs property? What about a hotel built in 1994 on land that once belonged to plaintiff?
Or cigars made in Spain from tobacco alleged to be grown in Cuba? I raised these issues
thirty years ago in the context of the property in suit coming to the United States. See
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment-Internalional Law Meets Civil Procedure, 59 Am
J Intl L 899 (1965). Clearly the litigation problems are more difficult when the property on
which the claim is based is not before the court.
45 See, for example, Lowenfeld, The Role of Government in International Trade at 400 (cited in note
39); Brigitte Stern, Can the United States Set Rules for the World? A French Viev, 31 J World Trade
4, 5 (1997); also Brigitte Stern, Vers la Mondialisation Juridique? Les Lois Helms.Burton et
D'Amato-Kennedy, 100 Rev G~n&ale de Droit International Public 979 (1996).
46 See Council Regulation 2271/96, 1996 OJ (L 309) 39, reprinted in 36 ILM 125 (1997).
Similar regulations were issued by Canada and Mexico.
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Burton violated several provisions of the GATT, and also of GATS.47 Even
though Tide III of Helms-Burton iticluded a provision authorizing the President
to suspend its application for six months and President Clinton had already done
so once, the EU asserted that suspension was not good enough, because the
very threat of suits under the Act, like the sword of Damocles, creates a
disincentive to investment or long-term trading relationships.48
Neither the United States nor the European Union had an incentive to test
the reach of Article XXI, the security exceptions provision of the GATT, and
eventually an out-of-court settlement was reached. 49 Helms-Burton was not
repealed, but both President Clinton and President Bush issued waivers of Title
II not strictly within the waiver authority included in the Act. In terms of
principle, that is of the limits placed by international law on unilateral sanctions,
the Helms-Burton episode confirms the teaching of the Pipeline episode.
IV. SANCTIONS AND GLOBALIZATION
The mention of the GATT and WTO at the end of the preceding section
may serve as a transition to this brief final section, which returns to the theme of
the symposium. Can frequent resort to economic sanctions-whether
multilateral or unilateral-be reconciled with dedication to globalization? On
one level, the answer is clearly no. Globalization is opposed to discrimination;
sanctions are by definition discriminatory. Globalization is based on removing
trade barriers; sanctions mean erecting barriers to trade. How, then, can frequent
resort to sanctions be reconciled with the GATT/WTO system, as it has
evolved over half a century?"°
In fact, the GATT system has had hardly any impact on the use of
sanctions for political ends, in part because many of the targets of sanctions
applied by the Western industrial states were not contracting parties to the
GATT at the relevant time-notably the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China,"1 and in part because there has been a consensus among
47 World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, United States-The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidaity Act, WTO DOC No
WT/DS38/2/Corr. 1 (Oct 14, 1996).
48 Id.
49 See European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the U.S. Helms-Burton
Act and the U.S. Iran Libya SanctionsAct, April 11, 1997, reprinted in 36 ILM 529 (1997).
50 Of course the GATT/WTO has its own system of sanctions, strengthened in the Uruguay
Round by creation of the Understanding on Dispute Settlement. But these sanctions are
designed to enforce the WTO's own rules if a measure is not withdrawn after it has been
found inconsistent with GATT or a related agreement. At least in theory, and for the most
part in practice, such sanctions are outside the present topic-economic sanctions for
political ends.
51 Also North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Hungary, Romania, East Germany,
and Bulgaria.
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officials and delegates concerned with international trade to keep political
disputes from jeopardizing the ever fragile effort to move forward together on
an economic agenda.52
I think there is still another reason why the GATT/WTO has had little
impact on policies of economic sanctions, and why persons (including the
present writer) who have spent much of their careers advocating reduction of
barriers to trade do not recoil at sanctions if they are applied with discretion and
moderation. Putting aside the many and complicated details, the rules of
international trade start with the assumption that states are instinctively
mercantilist (that is, if not checked they will seek to maximize their exports and
minimize their imports). The GATT and related agreements developed over half
a century are designed to counter these instincts, in the interest of rational
allocation of resources and gain for the international community as a whole.
Economic sanctions for political ends are the opposite of mercantilism.
States imposing sanctions-most often the United States, but other states as
well-decide to forgo economic gains for themselves and for the system as a
whole in order to promote other goals. Export controls deprive the exporting
country and its firms of export earnings; restraints on investment deprive
investors of economic opportunities and the home country and its citizens of
dividends; asset freezes, at least if frequent or long continued, make the state
imposing the sanctions less attractive to potential investors. A government that
undertakes such measures is asking its firms and its citizens to make sacrifices,
on the ground that there are issues more important than economic advantage-
aggressive war, systematic violation of human rights, subjugation of dependent
territories, sponsoring terrorism, protecting drug trafficking or money
laundering, and so on.
Seen in this light, the opponents of globalization ought to appreciate
economic sanctions, because they too see some issues as more important than
money-global warming, genetic modification of food, and child labor, to
mention just a few. The proponents of globalization ought to be skeptical of
justifications for imposition of sanctions and of continuation of sanctions
imposed long ago. But if the justification is persuasive, if the proposed measure
is proportional to the perceived threat, and if there is provision for expiration or
at least periodic review of the sanction, the globalists, like the anti-globalists, can
accept international economic sanctions, which in any event will continue to
hold a place at the intersection of politics, economics, and law.
52 For analysis of Article XXI of the GATT, the "Security Exceptions" provision of the GATT,
and a summary of the few cases that have arisen in connections with that article, see Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law 34-35, 755-64 (Oxford 2002).
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